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 BRAND CAPITAL AND INCUMBENT FIRMS' POSITIONS
 IN EVOLVING MARKETS
 Louis A. Thomas*
 Abstract-In many advertising-intensive industries one ob-
 serves market share persistenoe, i.e., firms maintaining lead
 market shares over long periods of time. I hypothesize that
 firms that have the largest stock of well-established brands, a
 stock that I term brand capital, are most likely to introduce
 new products in response to new market information about
 consumer preferences. Firms with less brand capital delay
 their introductions until the uncertainty concerning the mar-
 ket size is reduced. I present empirical support in a study of
 new product introductions in the U.S. beverage industry.
 I. Introduction
 H OW is it that some firms are able consis-
 tently to outperform competitors in prof-
 itability and market share? Given that consumer
 tastes and technologies evolve over time, one
 potential source of persistent advantage is the
 ability to be first to market new products success-
 fully. While a relationship has been documented
 between the order of entering new markets and
 the share subsequently sustained, there is little
 understanding of which firms first offer new
 products. Robinson and Fornell (1985), who found
 persistent share advantage among first entries in
 a sample of 371 mature consumer goods busi-
 nesses, attribute this phenomenon partly to
 Schmalensee's (1982) theoretical finding that later
 entering brands are at a disadvantage when con-
 sumers are uncertain about the quality of new
 products. A subsequent study by Urban et al.
 (1986) found that order of entry explained a
 significant amount of the variation in market
 share for a sample of 47 new brands across twelve
 product categories.
 There is some evidence which suggests that the
 ability to maintain share leadership is much
 stronger in advertising intensive industries than
 others. According to AdvertisingAge, of the top
 twenty-five consumer brands that were sold in
 1923, nineteen were still share leaders in 1983.
 Four brands fell to number two position, one to
 number three, and one to fifth.' Sutton (1991)
 finds evidence that the endogeneity of advertising
 expenditures places a lower bound on concentra-
 tion in the food and drink group.
 I wish to develop the idea that there exists a
 firm-specific asset, which I term brand capital,
 that rests in goodwill accrued by the firm's exist-
 ing brands. This goodwill explains why firms with
 high values of brand capital are most likely to
 introduce new products first, those with less brand
 capital wait and enter only if the market size is
 sufficiently large.
 As markets for new product varieties arise or
 are perceived, some are large and can accommo-
 date many entrants; small new markets can ac-
 commodate only a few. I will show that firms with
 high levels of brand capital introduce products in
 both large and small new markets, those with low
 levels of brand capital only in large markets.
 Thus, the high brand capital firm can maintain a
 higher share than its low brand capital rivals even
 as consumer tastes change. This offers a possible
 explanation for the share persistence phe-
 nomenon in advertising-intensive industries.
 There has been some work on brand-related
 goodwill in the economics literature. Wernerfelt
 and Sappington (1985) developed a model
 whereby two firms that have a brand image in
 one market introduce a new product along a
 linear city. In addition to the traditional trans-
 portation cost, each consumer faces an image
 cost. The further away the new product is from
 the original brand's image, the more uncertain
 the consumer is of the new brand's quality. Thus,
 firms have an incentive to introduce new brands
 "close" to the image of the original product. The
 authors also present some evidence that suggests
 that the further away a firm places a new brand
 from the original, the less likely it is to use the
 name of the original brand. Wernerfelt (1988)
 shows that brand names can be used as a signal
 of high quality.
 Raubitschek (1988) develops a model in which
 firms introduce more products as the probability
 of product success increases. The concept of
 brand capital suggests that firms with more brand
 capital will not only introduce more products but Received for publication March 9, 1993. Revision accepted
 for publication May 16, 1994.
 * University of Pennsylvania.  1AdvertisingAge, September 19, 1983.
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 also introduce early. Schmalensee (1978) devel-
 ops a model where existing firms introduce new
 brands in order to limit outside entry. While
 brand capital does not deal with entry deter-
 rence, it does explain the entry order of new
 incumbent brands.
 In this paper, I show that in the beer, soft
 drink, and coffee industries, the firms most likely
 to enter new products first in response to new
 information about consumer tastes are those with
 the most brand capital.
 II. Development of Hypotheses
 I now wish to develop three testable hypothe-
 ses of brand capital and entry order. Consider
 three different brands about a circular city. Two
 brands are owned by, say, firm A and one is
 owned by firm B. The true distribution of de-
 mand, which need not be uniform, is not known
 to either firm. Each firm initially has the same
 estimate and locates its brands around the circle
 through an unspecified process which does not
 influence what happens subsequently.2 The three
 incumbent brands are sunk. At some time new
 information arrives which causes each firm to
 increase its estimate of the number of consumers
 located near a given point. The new information
 may concern preferences of new demanders. The
 incumbents get random but sequential opportuni-
 ties to introduce brands at new locations on the
 basis of uncertain new information.
 All new brands are experience goods for buy-
 ers, who are correctly informed about the dis-
 tance of the claimed attributes of the new brand
 from established brands. Now consider a model
 of pioneering brands as in Schmalensee (1982).
 Consumers discount the utility from brands which
 they have not tried. The size of this discount
 decreases with the closeness of the new brand to
 the same firm's existing brand which the con-
 sumer has either tried or gained word-of-mouth
 recommendations. The consumer's lowered dis-
 count can be justified on the ground that the firm
 would not find it profitable to deliberately intro-
 duce a bad brand for fear of destroying goodwill
 on its existing brand.
 Each firm can introduce a new brand which is
 associated or identified with one of its existing
 brands. This association can be accomplished
 through what is known in marketing parlance as a
 brand extension: a new product which uses the
 brand name of an existing brand. For reasons
 discussed above, consumers are more likely to try
 new products which bear familiar brand names
 because they believe that such products are more
 likely to deliver the promised attributes.3 Because
 firm A has more existing brands than firm B by
 assumption, one of its brands is likely the nearest
 on the circle to some point about which the firms
 receive new information (equally likely to come
 from any point on the circle). From these as-
 sumptions the following testable behavioral hy-
 potheses follow.
 i) The firm with the largest stock of existing
 brands (i.e., the firm's brand capital) ex-
 pects to sell more units in any uncertain
 new market, so will enter some markets
 that other firms would skip as exception-
 ally unprofitable. Revealed market size will
 sometimes be larger than mean expecta-
 tion, causing the subsequent entry by low
 capital firms. Thus the high-capital firm is
 the most likely first entrant.
 ii) A low capital firm may enter first if the
 expected market size is large enough, but
 the probability that the high-capital firm
 enters second conditional on the low-
 capital firm having entered first is greater
 than the probability that the low capital
 firm enters second conditional on the high
 capital firm entering first.
 iii) A market with large expected size is both
 more likely to be roomy enough to attract
 a low capital first entrant and more likely
 to be profitable for multiple entrants.
 Throughout the discussion I have ignored price
 competition. To justify this assumption one can
 invoke models of vertical product differentiation,
 in which products of equal quality enter the mar-
 ket at the same price. Such a model seems consis-
 tent with the pricing practice in the brewing, soft
 drink, and coffee industries. High quality prod-
 ucts such as premium beer and coffee carry simi-
 2 I assume that firm A disperses its brands.
 3There is some theoretical and empirical support for this
 pattern of buying behavior. Aaker and Keller (1990) measured
 how consumers form attitudes towards brand extensions and
 found that consumer valuations were higher the closer the
 "fit" between the original brand and the extension.
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 lar (high) prices, but one observes very little price
 competition among them.
 I chose to test my hypotheses about brand
 capital and entry in the brewing, coffee, and soft
 drink industries for several reasons. First, be-
 cause many well-established brands are heavily
 advertised seemingly in order to maintain con-
 sumer goodwill, I wanted industries with high
 advertising to sales ratios. Beer, coffee, and soft
 drinks are highly advertised. Also, I wanted in-
 dustries that spend little on R & D, which would
 inject variation in entry sequences due to innova-
 tive effort or success. Finally, the introduction of
 new products evidently occurs in response to new
 information about demand, e.g., new product ac-
 tivity in the food and drink sector over the last
 two decades partly due to heightened interest in
 health and nutrition.4
 III. Model Specification and Estimation
 Procedure
 If firm i enters at position p during some
 round of new product introductions, let its profits
 be given by the following expression:
 Hip = qip(r- c) - F
 where qip is firm i's unit sales if it enters at
 position p, r is the price, c is unit costs, and F is
 the fixed entry cost. Since profits are not directly
 observable I define a latent variable yip, which is
 firm i's propensity to enter at position p. I will
 estimate yip using a rank ordered logit technique
 as described in Hausman and Ruud (1987). Let
 Yip be given by the following expression:
 Yip= qip - yF + Eip
 p= 1,...,P.
 ,3 is a P-vector of weights on unit sales and y is
 also a P-vector of weights on the fixed cost. The
 term (r - c) is incorporated into ,3. I assume that
 the sip is a randomly distributed disturbance
 term with a logistic distribution. Thus the proba-
 bility that firm i enters at the pth position in-
 stead 1,.. ., P - 1 is
 Fip [qil,**, qjps F; 0, Y]
 p
 = exp(qip 3 + yF)/ E exp(qip 3 + yF)j.
 The probability that firm i has a choice ordering
 ri of 1, ... , P where 1 is preferred to 2 etc. is
 given by the following expression:
 Pr(ri, qip, F; /3, y)
 p
 = FiP-p+1 [qip,. * , qip-p+l, F; 8, y] .
 p =2
 With the independence of irrelevant alternatives
 assumed (IIA) the above is simply the product of
 P - 1 logit likelihood functions. If there are N
 firms then the likelihood function is given by
 N
 L(/3, y) = J7log[Pr(ri, qi, F; , y)] .
 i=l
 The maximum likelihood estimate is the maxi-
 mizer of L( /, y).
 IV. Variables and Defilnitions
 A. Brand Capital
 In order to estimate the model I need proxies
 for qip and yip. The earlier discussion suggests
 that the quantity a firm sells is a function of the
 distance of its nearest brand from the location of
 its new product. The more established brands the
 firm has, the shorter this distance is likely to be.
 Thus the number of units that the firm expects to
 sell is proportional to its number of well-estab-
 lished brands, which I will thus use as a proxy-for
 qip. Henceforth I will refer to the number of
 well-established brands as the firm's "brand capi-
 tal" and to established brands as "capital brands."
 Previous studies of consumer package goods in-
 dustries, e.g., Raubitschek (1988), suggest that a
 brand is well established if it has survived for at
 least five years on the market. As the products
 examined in my study exhibit similar frequencies
 4As long as consumers choose product largely by brand
 name and not price there is no efficiency or business stealing
 effect. The introduction of a new nearby product does not
 force the firm to lower the price of its existing products. This
 is consistent with the highly inelastic demand of products in
 the food and drink group. As long as the updated market size
 is large enough to accommodate a new product, no incumbent
 can delay a new product from entering by choosing not to
 introduce itself. In particular, in a two period game, there
 exists no Nash equilibrium where the incumbent chooses to
 delay introduction in period one in order to preserve profits
 from his existing product line. The entrant would choose to
 enter during period one. Given this, the incumbent would
 earn greater profits by introducing during period one. Thus
 there is no disincentive to introduce due to a replacement or
 cannibalization effect.
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 of purchase, I employ this same rule. A brand
 introduced in year t and still offered in years
 t + 1, . . ., t + 5 is thus a capital brand.
 B. Order of Entry
 The model defines a round of new product
 introductions as a sequence of brands of a new
 product introduced by incumbent firms. The or-
 der of entry was determined for each round on
 the basis of the date each brand was nationally
 introduced, the brand with the earliest date being
 first, the one with the next earliest being second,
 and so forth. The actual order of entry will be
 used as a proxy for Yip in the following fashion.
 Given N incumbent firms in the industry, the
 number of alternative entry choices are as fol-
 lows:
 0 = if the firm did not introduce a product
 during the round
 1 = if the firm was the first to introduce
 2 = if the firm was second to introduce
 N = if the firm was last to introduce.
 Thus for the P - 1 logits, for example, yip = 1
 if firm i enters in the Pth position and zero
 otherwise. The rank ordered logit technique al-
 lows the logits to be estimated jointly.
 Each firm's capital brands were determined
 separately each round and measured as a propor-
 tion of total number of capital brands of the N
 incumbents.
 C. Market Segments
 The three hypotheses assume that consumers
 are familiar with established products of similar
 attributes. In order to measure brand capital and
 determine the new product rounds I need to
 define groups of products with similar attributes.
 I will call these groups market segments and
 measure a firm's number of established brands,
 i.e., its brand capital, in each segment. New infor-
 mation gives rise to markets for new product
 varieties within the segments. Each industry seg-
 ment is treated separately. Thus, the introduction
 of light beer in the popular priced segment is
 treated as a different round from the introduc-
 tion of light beer in the super premium or pre-
 mium segments.
 In the brewing industry the above assumption
 holds for two reasons. First, the segments exhibit
 strong vertical differentiation. It is likely that
 consumers who have higher incomes shop among
 the more expensive beers, others may confine
 their search to those which are less expensive.
 Second, advertisers deliberately target their prod-
 ucts to different groups of potential buyers using
 different media, so that consumers obtain the
 most information on the brands within a segment.
 I argue that this pattern suggests four segments
 in the beer industry. Popular beers are priced
 lowest and targeted at large-volume consumers,
 premium beers are priced in the mid-range, super
 premium beers are priced highest and targeted at
 upscale drinkers who also consume expensive im-
 ported beers, and malt, which is higher than
 others in alcohol content, is targeted at college
 students and ethnic drinkers. Elzinga (1986) sup-
 ports this segmentation. He finds beer drinking to
 be highly image conscious and price elasticity to
 be very high within segments, but low between
 them. The soft drink industry is segmented by
 product type, of which I identified four: colas;
 lemon-lime; root beer; and orange. Consumers
 can easily discern that these products are physi-
 cally different. Manufacturers of lemon-lime soft
 drinks typically address their advertising to con-
 sumers who do not like colas. While each of these
 segments might be further divided (e.g., diet colas
 or diet lemon-lime), the prevalence of common
 brand names suggests that products in these sub-
 segments are selected on the basis of a common
 set of goodwill assets and brand names. Thus, for
 purposes of testing the hypotheses I do not see a
 need to treat these as separate segments. I identi-
 fied two segments in the coffee industry: instant
 and regular. These two product types are very
 different, not only in taste, but also in terms of
 production process, production of instant coffee
 being much more capital-intensive. In addition,
 since manufacturers also advertise regular coffee
 as the higher quality product, this would suggest
 an element of vertical integration.
 Data on introductions of new products were
 obtained from Predicasts F & S Index, which cov-
 ers several industry trade journals, and supple-
 mented and confirmed using data supplied by
 Marketing Intelligence Inc., which covers more
 than 50 trade journals and employs a network of
 more than 200 field agents who monitor new
 product introductions in the United States. Infor-
 mation on market shares was obtained from an-
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 nual issues of Advertising Age and The Beverage
 Industry Annual Manual. Only products intro-
 duced nationally were included, and, thus only
 firms that offered at least one national brand are
 represented. Year and month of introduction
 were determined for each new product.
 V. Single Industry Analysis
 To conserve space I will present detailed re-
 sults only for the brewing industry and the pooled
 sample. More detailed results for the other indus-
 tries are available upon request. The mean levels
 of relative brand capital were 0.03 for the brew-
 ing, soft drink and coffee industries. The stan-
 dard deviations ranged from 0.07 for coffee to
 0.08 for beer.
 Table 1 gives the share of capital brands for
 the various brewers in each segment for 1980 and
 1990.
 Although some firms lack well-established
 brands in some segments, most have introduced
 new brands in these segments. For example, nei-
 ther Miller or Anheuser Busch has a well-estab-
 lished malt beer, each having introduced beers in
 this segment unsuccessfully, and limited to re-
 gional distribution. Both Heilemann and Pabst
 have tried to introduce both premium and super
 premium beers, and Coors recently entered the
 popular priced segment with a new beer called
 Keystone. Thus, most firms are active in all seg-
 ments even though they may not have a well-
 established brand in each segment.
 A new product round began when a new beer
 type was introduced. I then determined when
 other firms introduced new beer products of this
 type (see table 2). I identified a total of 18 new
 product rounds (a total of 40 new products) in the
 beer industry between 1972 and April 1991. Of
 the 18 new product rounds all but 2 were led by
 firms introducing product extensions, and out of
 the 40 new products all but 3 were extensions.
 This would suggest that the primary mechanism
 of affiliation is through the extension of a well-
 known brand name.
 Analysis of the soft drink and coffee industries
 proceeded much like that of the beer industry.5
 The 4 soft drink segments and 2 coffee segments
 were treated separately. There were a total of 14
 new product rounds in the soft drink industry and
 16 in coffee.6
 VI. Testing the Hypotheses
 A. Entry Order
 The results from the brewing industry are re-
 ported in table 3. The estimated coefficient for
 the first entry position is positive and significant.
 This result is consistent with the first maintained
 hypothesis that the greater the capital a firm has,
 the more likely it will enter in the first position
 rather than any other position. The estimated
 coefficients for the other positions are also posi-
 tive. The coefficients decline for later entries.
 This suggests that if the high capital firm does
 TABLE 1.-SHARE OF BRAND CAPITAL (%)
 BEER
 Malt Premium Super Premium Popular Priced
 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990
 Anheuser 0 0 43 36 100 75 0 0
 Miller 0 14 29 18 0 25 0 3.7
 Coors 0 0 14 27 0 0 0 0
 Stroh 20 29 14 18 0 0 12.5 26
 Heilemann 40 43 0 0 0 0 12.5 41
 Pabst 20 14 0 0 0 0 25 30
 Schlitz 20 - 0 - 0 19 -
 Olympia 0 - 0 - 0 25
 Schaefer 0 0 - 0 6.3
 5In the cola segment there were seven rounds: diet caffeine
 free, caffeine free, fruit flavored, aspartame-saccharin mix,
 100% Nutra Sweet, salt free, and calcium. In the lemon-lime
 segment there were three rounds: aspartame, fruit added, and
 fruit flavored. In the root beer segment there were two
 rounds: aspartame and cream flavored. Finally, in the orange
 segment: aspartame and fruit added.
 6 In the instant segment: freeze dried, decaffeinated, fla-
 vored, chicory, custom blends, Nutrasweet, premium, ice cof-
 fees. In the regular segment: decaffeinated, economy, econ-
 omy decaffeinated, premium decaffeinated, custom blends,
 flavored, premium, and fast roast.
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 TABLE 2.-BEER INDUSTRY NEW PRODUCT ROUNDS-1972-1991
 Segment Product Lead Firm Product Affiliation Year
 Malt Malt Coolers Heilemann La Croix Extensiona 1985
 Non-Alcoholic Stroh Barbican Extensionb 1986
 Dry Heilemann Colt 45 Dry Extension 1986
 Premium Low Calorie Miller Miller Lite Extension 1975
 Dry Anheuser Bud Dry Extension 1989
 Low Alcohol Anheuser LA Indirect 1984
 Affiliationc
 Cold Filtered Miller Genuine Draft Extension 1985
 Low Calorie Miller Genuine Draft- Extension 1989
 Cold Filtered Light
 No Alcohol Anheuser O'Douls Indirect 1989
 Affiliationc
 Super Low Calorie Anheuser Michelob Light Extension 1978
 Premium
 Dark Anheuser Michelob- Extension 1984
 Classic Dark
 Dry Anheuser Michelob Dry Extension 1988
 Cold Filtered Anheuser Michelob Draft Extension 1991
 Popular Low Alcohol Heilemann Old Style LA Extension 1984
 Priced
 Low Calorie Schlitz Schlitz Lite Extension 1976
 Dry Heilemann Old Style Dry Extension 1988
 Dark Heilemann Special Export Extension 1986
 Dark
 No Alcohol Heilemann Black Label Extensiond 1985
 Non-Alcoholic
 Malt Beverage
 aThe La Croix brand name was used in the sparkling cooler segment as a non-malt cooler.
 bStroh acquired the Barbican brand name from a U.K. brewer which sold the product in the U.S.
 c Indirect affiliation means that the corporate name was extensively used in the introduction. In this case the
 Anheuser-Busch name was extensively used to promote products.
 dHeilemann has extended the Black Label line to regular, light, low-alcohol, and malt.
 not enter first, it is next most likely to enter
 second, and if not second then third. Equiva-
 lently, given that the firm with the highest capital
 enters first, the firm with the next highest capital
 is most likely to enter second than in any other
 position. The firm with the next highest capital is
 then more likely to enter third than in any other
 position. This result is also consistent with the
 maintained hypothesis.
 The results for the soft drink industry conform
 to the hypothesis only in part. The greater the
 capital the more likely a firm is to enter in the
 first position rather than any other position. The
 coefficients for later entries, however, are higher
 than they are for the first. In the soft drink
 industry, the firm that has the largest share of
 capital brands introduced first only 43% of the
 time. Much of the nonconformance occurs in the
 cola segment, in which Royal Crown stands out as
 a very innovative firm, being first with a diet soft
 drink, and first with caffeine-free diet and salt-
 free drinks. In addition, it does not appear that
 these new products emerged nearer Royal
 Crown's products than Coke's or Pepsi's. Thus
 Royal Crown's strategy is not explained by the
 hypothesis.7
 The slope coefficients for the coffee industry
 are positive and significant, and their magnitudes
 decline with entry position. The results are con-
 sistent with the first hypothesis, although the
 difference between the first and second entry
 coefficients is small. Finally, I combine the data
 for a pooled estimation. The coefficients for the
 first, second, third, and fourth entry positions are
 positive and significant. In addition, the magni-
 tude of the coefficients are suggested by the
 hypothesis.
 It is possible that the IIA assumption does not
 hold. This would be true if firms decided on later
 entry by means of a different decision process not
 7Whatever Royal Crown's strategy it has not improved its
 performance. Its market share has declined from nearly 7% of
 the cola market in the early 1970s to just over 2% in 1990.
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Mon, 13 Jun 2016 17:54:47 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 528 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
 TABLE 3.-TEST FOR BRAND CAPITAL-ORDER OF ENTRY EFFECT
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Beer
 Constant -1.89a -1.92a -2.33a - 3.28a -3.69a -5.63a - 5.20a
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.38) (0.47) (1.17) (1.00)
 Capital 6.29a 4.21a 3 0lb 1.77 0.03 5.39 - 249.49c
 (1.20) (1.37) (1.83) (3.38) (5.52) (5.01) (45727)
 Number of Entries 18 11 6 2 1 1 1
 Long Likelihood -367.57
 Soft Drinks
 Constant -1.68a - 1.98a -2.63a - 4.07a 3.79a - 5.22a -5.22
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.28) (0.53) (0.49) (1.00) (1.00)
 Capital 6.31a 6.46a 8.13a 11.04a 3.57 - 131.96c - 131.96c
 (1.61) (1.73) (1.86) (2.45) (4.77) (36506) (36506)
 Number of Entries 14 11 9 5 4 0 0
 Log Likelihood - 365.63
 Coffee
 Constant -1.84 -2.07a -2.38a -3.16a -3.52a -5.13a -5.14a
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.25) (0.37) (0.45) (1.00) (1.00)
 Capital 7.06a 6.54a 4.31a - 4.16 -254.12c - 221.35C -21.35c
 (1.43) (1.53) (2.03) (8.67) (61013) (57344) (57344)
 Number of Entries 16 14 7 1 0 0 0
 Log Likelihood -365.04
 Pooled
 Constant -4.43 -3.58a -3.61a -4.72a 3.69a -5.74a -4.81a
 (0.46) (0.38) (0.42) (0.69) (0.54) (1.41) (1.00)
 Capital 15.62a 12.05a 10.20a 10.60a -0.04 4.70 -253.30c
 (1.74) (1.62) (1.79) (2.61) (4.67) (7.94) (32918)
 Number of Entries 48 36 22 8 5 1 1
 Log Likelihood - 294.73
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 a Significant at the 5% level.
 b Significant at the 10% level.
 c Estimate did not converge.
 TABLE 4.-HAUSMAN SPECIFICATION TEST
 Ranks (r) Likelihood Ratio
 1 294.56
 2 219.68
 3 141.84
 4 64.64
 5 24.76
 6 0.12
 encompassed by the model. If this is true it may
 account for the fact that coefficients for later
 entry are lower than for earlier entry. In order to
 test this I use a Hausman (1978) significance test
 based on the log likelihood functions. Again, as-
 sume there are P entry choices and N firms.
 L( , y)
 N r
 = E E log[Fp_,+l[qp, qpP-+j,F; ,]]
 n=1 p=2
 N P
 + E E log[Fp-p+l [qp,* qp_p+j, F; 8, y]
 n=1 p=r
 or,
 L(/ , y) = Lr( 81Y)
 N P
 + E E log[Fp-p+l [qp, * qp_p+j, F; , Y]] -
 n=1 p=r
 Let ,3r* and -y,. be the MLE of the second term
 on the right and Pr and yr be that for the first
 term. Then, -2[L(83p1 ) - Lr(f3r, Yr) -
 Lr*( 13r*, )yr*)] has a chi-square distribution with P
 degrees of freedom. One can estimate the statis-
 tic with increasing values of r. The results of this
 test are shown in table 4. The null that the
 coefficients decline because the model is misspec-
 ified is rejected at the 1% level up to the fifth
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 rank (i.e., r = 5), but not for the last position.
 The model might fail to describe the entry behav-
 ior of the firm that chooses to enter in the final
 position, although the small number of observa-
 tions might instead be responsible.
 In each segment there is a dominant firm, i.e.,
 a firm with far more brand capital than any of its
 rivals. In the malt and the popular priced seg-
 ments it is Heilemann; in the premium and super
 premium segments, Anheuser-Busch. Dominance
 poses a potential problem for the results pre-
 sented in table 3, which may be driven by the
 entry pattern of the dominant firm. For example,
 if the dominant firm enters first as expected, but
 the other firms enter in some random order, the
 empirical results would still conform to the first
 maintained hypothesis. If I were to omit from the
 sample the firms with the greatest share of capi-
 tal brands, and then reestimate the model, the
 results should not be statistically significant if I
 am only capturing the activity of those firms. I
 thus omitted in the malt and popular priced
 segments all new products introduced by
 Heilemann, in the premium and super premium
 segments, all products introduced by Anheuser
 Busch and reestimated the model. The results are
 presented in table 5. Again, the results from the
 beer industry are consistent with the maintained
 hypothesis. Firms with high capital are more likely
 to enter in the first position than any other posi-
 tion. In the soft drink industry, the results are
 qualitatively similar to those estimated earlier:
 while high capital firms are more likely to enter,
 they are not more likely to enter in the first
 position. In the coffee industry the estimated
 coefficients are positive and significant for the
 TABLE 5.-BRAND CAPITAL AND ENTRY ORDER SEGMENT SHARE LEADER OMITTED
 1 2 3 4 5 6
 Beer
 Constant -1.84a - 2.26a - 3.29a -3.68a -5.82a -5.17a
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.39) (0.48) (1.34) (1.00)
 Capital 5.86a 3.66 2.95 0.68 8.88 - 284.64c
 (1.73) (2.36) (3.97) (6.19) (7.23) (82172)
 Number of Entries 12 6 2 1 1 0
 Log Likelihood - 252.76
 Soft Drinks
 Constant -1.91a -2.56a -4.13a -3.81a -5.21 -5.21a
 (0.20) (0.27) (0.57) (0.50) (1.00) (1.00)
 Capital 0.lla 10.29a 14.53a 5.82 - 140.1c - 140.1c
 (2.05) (2.31) (3.20) (5.28) (47241) (47241)
 Number of Entries 13 10 5 4 0 0
 Log Likelihood - 237.79
 Coffee
 Constant -2.02a -2.25a -3.12a -3.48a - 5.09a - 5.09a
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.37) (0.45) (1.00) (1.00)
 Capital 9.19a 3.78 - 4.76 - 267.47c - 240.92c - 240.92c
 (2.04) (3.02) (9.53) (10097) (88785) (88785)
 Number of Entries 15 7 1 0 0 0
 Log Likelihood - 245
 Pooled
 Constant -4.053a - 335a 4 99a - 3.74a -5.89a -4.83a
 (0.49) (0.41) (0.81) (0.55) (1.52) (1.00)
 Capital 17.09a 11 osa 14.08a 1.25 7.04 -265.52c
 (2.32) (2.20) (3.67) (5.01) (9.17) (41672)
 Number of Entries 40 23 8 5 1 1
 Log Likelihood - 203.69
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 a Significant at the 5% level.
 b Significant at the 10% level.
 c Estimate did not converge.
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 first entry position. The results from the pooled
 data set are fully consistent with the first hypoth-
 esis.
 B. Conditional Entry Order
 The preceding tests address the first hypothe-
 sis: the high brand capital firm is most likely to
 enter first. While the results are consistent with
 it, they are also consistent with a number of other
 hypotheses. In particular, any firm-specific asset
 that is correlated with brand capital (e.g., market
 share or distribution costs) could yield the same
 result. The key feature that will distinguish my
 hypothesis from these alternatives is that the lat-
 ter imply that the firms always enter in the same
 order with some stochastic error, while the for-
 mer explains under what conditions the order of
 entry may vary. I hope to show that the second
 and third hypotheses distinguish my model from
 these alternatives.
 The second hypothesis holds that the probabil-
 ity of a firm with high brand capital entering
 second conditional on its rival having already
 introduced a product is greater than the probabil-
 ity of a low brand capital firm introducing condi-
 tional on a high brand capital firm's prior intro-
 duction. I can test this proposition by means of
 the entry sequences I have identified. Specifi-
 cally, I measure the number of times a firm that
 did not begin the sequence nonetheless intro-
 duced a product during the sequence. For each
 firm, I count the number of sequences in which
 the firm was not the first to enter and the number
 of times that firm introduced a new brand at any
 point in these sequences. Dividing these two
 numbers yields the percentage of times the firm
 introduced conditional on not having entered first.
 The results for the three industries are pre-
 sented in table 6. The results for the brewing
 industry are consistent with the second hypothe-
 sis. The firm with the highest share of capital
 brands has the highest probability of entering
 given that it does not enter first. Using a chi-
 square test, for each segment of the brewing
 industry I can reject at the 5% level the null
 hypothesis that the probabilities are equal.
 The results for the soft drink industry are not
 as strong. In the cola segment, the hypothesis
 predicts that one should find Coca Cola and
 Pepsi with the highest probabilities. Instead it is
 Royal Crown. In the lemon-lime segment the
 hypothesis suggests that Coca Cola should be
 ahead of 7 Up. In the root beer segment A & W
 should be ahead of Crush, and in orange either
 Cadbury or Crush should be ahead of Coca Cola.
 The null hypothesis can be rejected only for the
 cola segment. The results for the instant coffee
 segment are as expected. General Foods leads
 Nestle and P & G. In the regular segment the
 hypothesis would suggest that P & G be ahead of
 Nestle. This latter result is significant only at the
 10% level. I also estimated the probabilities that
 a firm entered given that it did not enter first or
 second.8 I found that while the results in the
 brewing industry are consistent with the second
 maintained hypothesis, they are not significant. I
 again found that Royal Crown has a higher prob-
 ability than Coca Cola or Pepsi of entering given
 that it did not enter first or second. The results
 from the coffee industry are as predicted. I also
 estimated the probability that a firm entered given
 that it did not enter first, second, or third. There
 are too few observations to draw any significant
 conclusions.
 C. Order of Entry and Expected Market Size
 The findings thus far bear on the first two
 hypotheses of brand capital. I now turn to the
 third hypothesis that the low capital firm may
 introduce first if the expected market size is large
 enough. If this hypothesis explains the data well,
 I should find that the firm with the highest share
 of capital brands is less likely to lead when the
 expected market size is large. Most importantly,
 this test, like the previous one, allows me to
 distinguish brand capital from firm heterogeneity.
 The assumption of firm heterogeneity yields no
 prediction about the order of entry of firms if the
 advantaged firm fails to enter first.
 Because the expected market size for each of
 the rounds discussed cannot be observed directly
 I must use a proxy. The primary proxy for the
 expected market size is the number of firms that
 actually introduced a new product during a new
 product round. The larger the expected market
 size the more firms that find it profitable to enter
 with a new product. If one assumes that firms are
 right, on average, in their estimates of the market's
 8 These results are available upon request.
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Mon, 13 Jun 2016 17:54:47 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 BRAND CAPITAL AND INCUMBENT FIRMS' POSITIONS 531
 TABLE 6. -PROBABILITY THAT A FIRM ENTERED IN A SEQUENCE
 IN WHICH IT DID NOT ENTER FIRST
 Beer
 Malt Premium Super Premium Popular Priced
 Anheuserc 0 100 (a) 0
 Miller 0 33.3 50 20
 Coors 0 66.7 0 0
 Stroh 50 33.3 0 20
 Heilemann 100 0 0 100
 Pabst 0 0 0 60
 X2 statistic 9.25b job 14a 11.6a
 Soft Drinks
 Cola Lemon Root Beer Orange
 Coca Cola 66.7 33.3 0 100
 Pepsi 71.4 66.7 50 50
 7 Up 50 50 0 0
 Dr. Pepper 57.1 0 0 0
 Royal Crown 80 0 0 0
 Cadbury 0 0 0 50
 A&W 0 0 100 0
 Crush 0 0 100 100
 2 statistic 14.37a 9.22 8.68 7.6
 Coffee
 Instant Regular
 General Foods 75 100
 Procter & Gamble 25 40
 Nestle 50 57
 Borden 0 0
 Chock 0 0
 2 statistic 10.14a 12.67a
 a Significant at the 5% level.
 bSignificant at the 10% level.
 c Anheuser led each round.
 size, then the number of entrants can be used as
 a proxy for expected size.
 Returning to the econometric specification, I
 now estimate the probability that firm i enters in
 position P instead of positions 1,. . ., P - 1 by,
 Pr(qi,, F; /3, -y)
 p
 = FiP-p+l [qip* qip-p+l, H, F; /,y]
 p =2
 where
 Fip[ qil,* ** qjp, H, F; 3, 8y]
 p
 = exp(qipH/3 + yF)/ E exp(qjpH/3 + yF)
 -p=l
 In this case H is a dummy variable which is equal
 to one if two or more firms entered with a new
 product during the round firm i entered at posi-
 tion p. H is equal to zero otherwise. If the
 estimated 83's are positive and significant, then
 the greater the expected market size, the greater
 is the probability that a low capital firm will enter
 early. The results of this are presented in table 7.
 The results are consistent with the third hy-
 pothesis across the three industries. The esti-
 mated coefficients from the pooled results are
 positive and significant for the first, second, third,
 and fourth entry positions. The same holds true
 in the beer and soft drink industries. In the
 coffee industry the result holds for the first, sec-
 ond, and third entry positions.
 To assess this result's robustness I used another
 proxy for expected market size, the first-year ad-
 vertising expenditures for the product that led a
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 TABLE 7. -MARKET SIZE AND ORDER OF ENTRY
 NUMBER OF ENTRANTS AS A PROXY FOR SIZE
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Pooled
 Constant - 3.35a -3.66a _3.77 a _4.86a - 3.94a - 5.98a - 5.07a
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.40) (0.65) (0.54) (1.40) (1.00)
 High-Capital 16.66a 16.73a 15.21a 15.55a 5.48 10.12 -247.08c
 (1.84) (1.91) (2.04) (2.69) (4.72) (7.87) (34183)
 Log Likelihood - 286.98
 Beer
 Constant -1.75a -1.99a - 2.41a - 3.36a _3.77a - 5.69a - 5.27a
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.38) (0.47) (1.16) (1.00)
 High-Capital 10.52a 10.03a 8.86a 7.64a 5.87 11.11a - 249.26c
 (2.25) (2.31) (2.59) (3.85) (5.85) (5.11) (49002)
 Log Likelihood - 364.04
 Coffee
 Constant -1.811a - 2.11a - 2.41a 3. 19a - 3.56a - 5.17 a -5.17a
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.25) (0.37) (0.45) (1.00) (1.00)
 High-Capital 8.08a 8.14a 5.91a -2.57 -252.27c - 217.85c -217.85c
 (1.70) (1.77) (2.20) (8.64) (64472) (59143) (59143)
 Log Likelihood - 363.80
 Soft Drinks
 Constant -1.67a -2.03a -2.67a - 4.11a -3.84a - 5.28a -5.28a
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.28) (0.53) (0.49) (1.00) (1.00)
 Low-Capital 10.15a 11.18a 12.83a 15.71a 8.33b - 100.66c - 100.66c
 (2.38) (2.42) (2.53) (3.00) (5.02) (36571) (3671)
 Log Likelihood - 355.95
 a Significant at the 5% level.
 bSignificant at the 10% level.
 c Estimate did not converge.
 round.9 Each firm must decide how much to
 spend on advertising if it decides to introduce a
 new brand. Firms with the same information and
 brand capital should spend the same amount on
 advertising in a given segment. Thus controlling
 for brand capital, advertising expenditures should
 be proportional to expected market size.
 I will first test the hypothesis using the rank
 ordered logit technique. Advertising data were
 obtained from Leading National Advertisers and
 adjusted for inflation. For each new product
 round I determined the real advertising expendi-
 tures for the first product in the round during its
 first year of introduction. Across all rounds the
 median value was $3.25 million. I assume that
 market size was expected to be small in those
 rounds with a first year advertising expense for
 first entry less than this, large in those above it.
 In this case I estimated the same model as
 described above but H is now equal to one if the
 first year advertising expense of the product lead-
 ing the round is greater than the mean and zero
 otherwise. As before, from the above expression a
 likelihood function can be determined and MLE
 found for the 83 's and y. The results are reported
 in table 8. In the pooled data set the coefficients
 for the first, second, third, and fourth entry posi-
 tions are significantly larger for the high expected
 size markets than the low. This means that a low
 capital firm is more likely to enter first, the larger
 is the market's expected size.
 The model is also estimated for each of the
 three industries separately using its own median
 first-year advertising expenditure. In the beer in-
 dustry one finds that for all but the seventh entry
 position firms have a greater probability of enter-
 ing the larger is the expected market size. In the
 9 If the product was introduced during the first three months
 of year t, I used the advertising expenditures for that product
 during year t; if the product was introduced later during year
 t, I used the first year advertising expenditures for the product
 during year t + 1.
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 coffee industry one finds this resuilt for the first,
 second, and third entry positions. Again, the re-
 sults are weaker in the soft drink industry. Only
 in the case of the third entry positions are the
 results consistent with the maintained hypothesis.
 The other coefficients, while the correct sign, are
 not significant.
 As an additional test using this proxy for ex-
 pected market size I estimated the following logit
 model:
 LEADiS = p + 12(RAL $AD)is + Eis
 The dependent variable, LEAD, was set equal to
 one if the firm with the highest share of capital
 brands in segment s during the year round i
 began was the first to introduce, zero otherwise.
 REAL $AD is the real first year advertising ex-
 penditure for the product that led round i in
 segment s.
 If the above model is estimated for each indus-
 try separately, the small number of observations
 provide limited empirical leverage, and so results
 are presented in table 9 using the entire pooled
 cross section. A logistic distribution is assumed
 for the dependent variable. The results from the
 pooled data and for the beer industry individually
 are significant at the 5% level in a one tailed test,
 and the model does explain a substantial amount
 of the variation in the data as indicated by the
 percentage correct statistic. Firms with a low
 share of capital brands are thus more likely to
 lead a round when the expected market size is
 TABLE 8.-MARKET SIZE AND ORDER OF ENTRY
 ADVERTISING AS A PROXY FOR SIZE
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Pooled
 Constant -2.09a -2.23a - 2.84a - 4.07a -3.76a - 5.66a _5.02a
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.31) (0.53) (0.52) (1.26) (1.00)
 High-Capital 8.34a 7.28a 8.21a 9.18a 3.85 6.96 - 188.89c
 (1.41) (1.52) (1.65) (2.14) (3.97) (6.22) (34129)
 Log Likelihood - 318.82
 Beer
 Constant -1.73 - 1.95a -2.41a - 3.41 -3.67a - 5.57a - 5.17a
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.26) (0.41) (0.47) (1.14) (1.00)
 High-Capital 10.24a 9.26a 9.15a 8.22a 6.0a 11.01a - 9945C
 (2.42) (2.53) (2.71) (3.86) (5.96) (4.99) (42053)
 Log Likelihood - 332.42
 Coffee
 Constant -1.56a -1.84a - 2.34a -3.18a 3.52a - 5.13a -5.13a
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.25) (0.39) (0.45) (1.00) (1.00)
 High-Capital 5.53a 5.1 la 5.74a -253.95c - 246.46c - 217.43c - 217.43c
 (2.09) (2.29) (2.46) (85446) (82442) (83087) (83087)
 Log Likelihood -342.05
 Soft Drinks
 Constant -1.5 la -1.80a -2.36a - 3.91a -3.70a - 5.14a - 5.14a
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.26) (0.53) (0.49) (1.00) (1.00)
 Low-Capital 3.44 3.19a 5.67a 10.71a 4.54 - 112.51c - 112.51c
 (2.22) (2.50) (2.42) (2.77) (4.74) (57234) (57234)
 Log Likelihood -340.87
 Pooled
 Constant -4.31a - 3.59a -3.8la -4.98a - 3.56a - 5.57 a -4.76a
 (0.47) (0.41) (0.46) (0.76) (0.54) (1.39) (1.00)
 Low-Capital 13.7la 10.63a 7.91a 5.26 -305.75c -261.86 -284c
 (1.79) (1.72) (2.19) (4.88) (47451) (56663) (57507)
 High-Capital 16.95a 13.68a 13.76a 15.06a 4.20 8.54 - 206.97c
 (2.16) (2.11) (2.24) (2.92) (4.50) (7.76) (44512)
 Log Likelihood - 265.03
 a Significant at the 5% level.
 bSignificant at the 10% level.
 c Estimate did not converge.
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 TABLE 9.-EQUATION (2) ESTIMATED FOR EACH INDUSTRY
 AND ALL INDUSTRIES
 Beer Coffee Soft Drinks All
 Constant 1.87 1.07 0.95 0.75
 (2.2) (0.99) (1.03) (1.74)
 Real $Ad -0.117 -0.45 -0.36 -0.12
 (1.71) (1.53) (1.43) (1.91)
 Percentage
 Correct 82.3 83.3 71.4 62.8
 N= 43
 I= 7.04
 U= 5.29
 large, consistent with the third maintained hy-
 pothesis.
 VII. Conclusions
 This paper began by observing persistence of
 market shares in industries with high advertising
 expenditures. While there has been much re-
 search on first mover advantages and brand pro-
 liferation, these theories do not explain why some
 firms remain share leaders even as tastes change
 or new information about them becomes avail-
 able. Brand capital offers a possible explanation
 for this phenomenon. As firms acquire new infor-
 mation, small and large markets for new product
 varieties open. The firm with the greatest brand
 capital is most likely to occupy all new markets,
 and firms with less brand capital occupy large
 ones. Thus, the high brand capital firm can hold
 on to its lead.
 In the beer and coffee industries, the firm with
 the higher share of capital brands is most likely to
 enter first with a new product in response to new
 information. Moreover, in the beer industry, the
 firm that enters second has a higher share of
 capital brands than those that enter later. In the
 coffee industry,, firms that enter first, second or
 third have more high capital brands than those
 that enter later. These results offer some support
 for the brand capital hypotheses. Results from
 the soft drink industry offer somewhat less sup-
 port. In the soft drink industry, the firm with the
 highest share of capital brands was not the most
 likely to enter first. This is largely due to the
 unexplained strategy of one firm, Royal Crown.
 This strategy has not improved the firm's perfor-
 mance.
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